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Abstract: In recent years, transparency has been proposed as the solution to, and the cause of, a remarkable range of
public problems. The proliferation of seemingly contradictory claims about transparency becomes less puzzling, this
essay argues, when one appreciates that transparency is not, in itself, a coherent normative ideal. Nor does it have
a straightforward instrumental relationship to any primary goals of governance. To gain greater purchase on how
transparency policies operate, scholars must move beyond abstract assumptions and drill down to the specific legal,
institutional, historical, political, and cultural contexts in which these policies are crafted and implemented. The field
of transparency studies, in other words, is due for a “sociological turn.”

T

here is a famous scene in the television show
The Simpsons in which Homer Simpson
raises a beer mug for a drunken toast and
proclaims, “To alcohol: the cause of, and solution
to, all of life’s problems!” As the jumping-off point
for this essay, I propose to adapt Homer Simpson’s
maxim. For if the word “alcohol” is replaced in that
toast by the word “transparency,” the revised version
would encapsulate, to a disconcerting degree, the last
decade’s worth of scholarship on open government
policy.
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Transparency, that is, has been identified as the cause
of, and solution to, a remarkable range of problems.
On the one hand, commentators routinely assert
or assume that transparency is indispensable to
government accountability, democratic deliberation,
citizen empowerment, public-spirited regulation,
and public trust in the policy process. Transparency,
in this discourse, has been endowed with “quasireligious significance” (Hood 2006, 3). On the other
hand, a growing number of commentators warn that
open government regimes have contributed to the
decline of deliberation, dealmaking, and regulatory
capacity in legislative and administrative bodies; to
the empowerment not of ordinary citizens but of
business lobbyists and commercial enterprises that
exploit these regimes for private gain; and to the
collapse of confidence in democratic institutions
and the resurgence of interest in nondemocratic
alternatives (Pozen and Schudson 2018). A think
tank called the Congressional Research Institute
(2019) has collected more than 500 citations from
political scientists, legal scholars, and journalists
attesting to these “dark sides” of sunlight. In Western

academic circles, transparency thus finds itself more
venerated and denigrated than ever: still believed by
many to be “the sine qua non of good governance”
(Michener 2015, 184), yet increasingly suspected
of facilitating antiregulatory or neoliberal agendas
and of undermining the very values it is meant to
promote.
What are we to make of the proliferation of
contradictory claims about transparency’s impacts?
And how can transparency scholarship progress as a
field in the face of such dissensus?
In this essay, I will advance two main arguments
as the beginning of an answer to these questions.
First, as to the seemingly schizophrenic state of
the literature, I will suggest that there is nothing
incoherent about transparency policies yielding
positive outcomes in certain settings and negative
or even opposite outcomes in other settings because
transparency is not, in itself, a coherent normative
ideal. Nor does it have a straightforward instrumental
relationship to any primary goals of governance.
Second, it follows that to gain greater purchase on
how transparency policies operate, scholars must
move beyond abstractions and formalisms to drill
down into the specific legal, institutional, historical,
political, and cultural contexts in which these policies
are crafted and implemented. As a shorthand, I will
refer to this kind of scholarship as “sociological”
and to the direction I am urging the field to take
as a “sociological turn”—although as will become
clear, I mean to use these terms in a broad sense that
embraces the methodologies and insights of numerous
disciplines.
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The Implausibility of Transparency as a Normative Ideal
Public administration scholarship focuses on transparency’s role
as a regulatory technique, generally in the form of legal directives
or structural designs to make institutions more accessible to the
outside world. It is uncontroversial to observe of most regulatory
techniques—mandates, nudges, taxes, subsidies, incentives, voting
rules, debate rules—that they may help certain groups and interests,
and they may harm other groups and interests, potentially at the
same time. Everything depends on the details. It is absurd to be proincentives or anti-subsidies, say, as a categorical matter. One has to
know exactly what is being incentivized or subsidized, and how.

almost any account of the good; and that the success or failure of
public policies can be meaningfully judged against.

It might seem obvious that the same would be true of transparency,
except that a great deal of writing on the subject does not treat this as
true at all. On the contrary, much of the writing takes its desirability
as a given and is unabashedly pro-transparency in a way that, again,
would seem odd for incentives, subsidies, or the like. For instance, in
response to a recent critical study of transparency, a review quipped, “Is
there ambivalence in the value of government transparency? Certainly,
if you have something to hide” (Neacsu 2019, 53). Otherwise, the
review implied, there is nothing to be ambivalent about; anyone
who questions transparency consequently becomes suspicious. In the
estimation of this reviewer and countless commentators, transparency
is not just a regulatory technique. It is also a fundamental policy goal
in its own right, a value to be prized and maximized. This widespread
“reification” of transparency, as political theorist Darin Barney
describes it, has converted the concept in the minds of many “from
a social relationship or process into an object or thing; from a means
into an end-in-itself” (Barney 2008, 91).

A case might be made for viewing transparency as a specially
privileged procedural norm, or even “something suspended between
primary objectives and secondary virtues” (Schudson 2015, 23).
What is exceedingly difficult to imagine is a theory of political
morality or justice that would demand the pursuit of transparency
for transparency’s sake. Certain strains of deliberative democratic
theory probably come closest here, but I am unaware of any version
of deliberativism that makes a primary virtue out of transparency.
The overriding objective, rather, is generally something like
reasoned debate, equal communicative freedom, or an open and
inclusive environment for collective will formation (Bächtiger
et al. 2018). Although transparency might contribute to good
deliberation—might even, in some respects, be essential to it—the
goal is not transparency. The goal is good deliberation, however
defined.

On this view, researchers are apt to go astray when they ask about
transparency’s impacts on bureaucratic performance or social
improvement. The point of transparency policies is to generate
transparency. And to the extent that a policy succeeds at generating
transparency, that is a good thing, either because transparency
is seen as inherently good or because it is assumed to have an
inherently positive and proximate association with some other
value that is seen as inherently good, most often democracy or
accountability.
This way of thinking about transparency, seeing it as an end in itself or
the functional equivalent, seems to me deeply misguided. To see why,
it may be helpful to draw on the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre’s
distinction between primary virtues and secondary virtues. The
primary virtues, in MacIntyre’s formulation, are “directly related to the
goals which [people] pursue as the ends of their life” (MacIntyre 1967,
24). The secondary virtues “concern the way in which we … go about
our projects” (24)—not what we are trying to achieve but how we try
to achieve it.
Translated to the public policy context, we might say that
values such as social welfare, human and ecological flourishing,
minimization of pain and suffering, and freedom from domination
are primary virtues. These are the kinds of values that ought to
guide the efforts taken by a decent government on behalf of its
citizens. They may be articulated any number of ways and contested
along any number of dimensions. But they reflect ideals that make
people’s lives better in an immediate sense, to the extent they are
realized; that are central to the construction of a good society on

Transparency, for the most part, is not like that. A public policy that
reduces the amount of pain and suffering in a country makes that
country a better place, at least in one important respect. A public
policy that reduces the amount of opacity in the decision making
of a government agency may or may not make the country a better
place. One would have to learn how that increase in transparency
is affecting the agency as well as the individuals and entities that
interact with the agency.

The Ambiguity of Transparency as a Practical Ideal
Scholars and advocates, accordingly, risk making a category mistake
when they treat transparency as a normative maximand or an
end in itself. Instead, transparency must by and large be viewed
in instrumental terms, as a means to other ends. Nevertheless, an
objector might retort at this point, transparency’s instrumental
relationship to various public values could be so tight that little is
lost by conflating the two. Even if transparency is not a coherent
normative ideal, perhaps it serves reasonably well as a practical ideal
in this sense—a standard of governance worth stressing and striving
for, given that it has such a strong affinity with widely agreed-upon
goals that may be harder to measure or specify.
The problem is that, in area after area, this is simply false.
Transparency’s instrumental relationship to most goals of
governance turns out to be quite complicated. We know this by now
from theory, from empirical observation, and from law.
Theoretical Ambiguity

We know this theoretically, because for every marvelous benefit
that might flow from opening up a government initiative or
institution, it does not take much creativity to posit a potential cost
that undermines or nullifies that benefit. Consider the relationship
between transparency and corruption. Legal scholar Michael Gilbert
published a paper in 2018 pointing out that just as the state cannot
deter corruption without information, bad actors cannot engage
in corruption without information—who is buying, who is selling,
who can be trusted. By making it easier and cheaper for all parties to
obtain this sort of information, transparency has crosscutting effects.
It deters some corrupt acts while facilitating others. Regulators, in
Gilbert’s model, face nothing less than a “tragic tradeoff” (2018, 138).
Seeing Transparency More Clearly 327
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Or consider transparency and trust. It was a truism for 1960s and
1970s reformers that greater transparency from government would
lead to greater trust in government (Pozen 2018). Over the past
two decades, however, scholars have advanced a range of theoretical
arguments that imply the exact inverse: for instance, because
transparency mandates hold complex processes to unrealistic
standards; because they foster a “culture of suspicion” (O’Neill
2002, 77) and a spirit “of conflict in state–citizen relations” (Erkkilä
2012, 25); or because they leave institutions unable to “respond to
the demands placed on” them (Rosanvallon 2008, 259).
We cannot say with any confidence, a priori, whether these
arguments are correct or whether the old 1960s–1970s arguments
are correct. Both sets of claims are plausible. About all we can
say with confidence, as a theoretical matter, is that transparency’s
relationship to trust is far from self-evident. The same goes for its
relationship to the incidence of corruption, the quality of debate,
the influence of powerful lobbies, and the content of policy outputs.

personal privacy, commercial secrets, and internal deliberations
(Pozen 2017, 1106). While the precise contours of these exemptions
can be controversial, their existence generally is not.
The immanent normative structure of open government law thus
reflects that transparency can do damage, can go too far, and must
be negotiated carefully if an attractive balance of consequences is
to be achieved. When we talk about transparency in governance,
we are always talking about something short of full exposure. The
landscape of open government law is covered in shadows, as it
were, aimed at “translucency” more than true transparency (Samaha
2006, 923).
Implications for Transparency Scholarship
Where does this leave transparency scholarship? The implications
are both positive and negative. Certain types of inquiries and
methodologies look especially promising, in light of the points just
reviewed, while other types of arguments and approaches seem
especially unlikely to advance understanding.

Empirical Ambiguity

A wealth of descriptive research bears out this complexity.
The U.S. Congress has attracted particular interest. In 2012,
a task force was established by the American Political Science
Association to study the breakdown of negotiation in that body.
Its final report, published in 2013, looked closely at legislative
developments since the 1970s and found that “gridlock in the
American Congress has been exacerbated by the ‘sunshine laws’
that opened up committee deliberation to the public but also
to lobbyists and other special interests” (Martin 2013, 127) and
that “transparency often imposes direct costs on successful deal
making” by tying politicians to partisan scripts and interfering
with the good-faith search for compromise solutions (Binder and
Lee 2013, 63). At this point, task force members concluded, “the
empirical evidence on the deliberative benefits of closed-door
interactions seems incontrovertible” (Warren and Mansbridge
2013, 108).
I agree with this assessment, but I would add that the potential
deliberative downsides of closed-door interactions seem equally
incontrovertible, from a greater risk of groupthink and epistemic
closure to a greater risk of reliance on self-serving or illicit rationales
(e.g., Lee 2008). The dysfunctional dynamics in the U.S. Congress,
moreover, may not generalize to other less polarized settings. My
point in highlighting this example is not to suggest that transparency
is inimical to political bargaining, nor to deny that certain
transparency reforms have had salutary effects; the Environmental
Protection Agency’s Toxics Release Inventory, to take another
American example, has been credited “with playing a central role in
driving improvements in pollution performance” since the late 1980s
(Karkkainen 2001, 288). My point is that transparency’s association
with constructive deliberation, like its association with virtually every
important governance goal, has proved in practice to be thoroughly
“contextual and contingent” (Schauer 2011, 1356; cf. Meijer 2013).
Legal Ambiguity

Finally, we know that transparency’s instrumental relationship to
many goals of governance is complicated from the design of freedom
of information laws the world over. These laws ubiquitously carve
out exemptions for the protection of national security, public safety,
328

Less Transparency Fetishism

Appreciating transparency’s implausibility as a normative ideal
and its ambiguity as a practical ideal counsels, above all, less
romanticism and more realism about the subject. Some amount of
romanticism may be useful in political advocacy; constant attention
to detail has costs as well as benefits. But scholars and practitioners
should be on guard against claims that deny, implicitly or explicitly,
the contextual and contingent character of transparency’s value.
Such denialism can take many forms, among them:
• sweeping assertions about what transparency can accomplish
on its own;
• unstated assumptions that greater transparency is necessarily
desirable;
• the reflexive attribution of bad motives to officeholders who
seek to withhold information or otherwise chafe against the
constraints of openness requirements; and
• overconfidence in the external validity of experimental studies
conducted in contexts far removed from the realm of public
governance
All of these moves can be seductive. None is well founded. The
ubiquity of the first three suggests that, for all of the sophisticated
analyses that have been produced, transparency continues to
function as a “magic concept” (Alloa 2018) in mainstream academic
and political discourse.
Scholars and practitioners may wish to adopt some thinner
working premises. For instance, it seems reasonable to presume
that more publicly available information is preferable to less
publicly available information, all else being equal. It also seems
reasonable to presume that certain sorts of transparency about
certain sorts of actions—say, information about patterns and
practices of state violence—are especially crucial to democratic
accountability and especially prone to be withheld without
just cause. Some “forms of transparency concerning the basic
contours of government action,” moreover, “may well be
prerequisites to individual and collective self-determination
and can be justified without consequentialist assumptions”
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(Pozen 2018, 161). Acknowledging the contingent and contextual
nature of transparency’s value does not require abandoning moral
commitment or accepting that every aspect of transparency’s value
is contingent and contextual to the same degree.

and upshots of transparency regimes—but only a little. And they
are liable to obscure as much as they reveal. Afghanistan, ranked
177 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2017
Corruption Perceptions Index (2018), currently enjoys the top RTI
Rating in the world (Centre for Law and Democracy 2018).

Less Transparency Formalism

Scholars and practitioners should also be on guard against drawing
strong conclusions from the texts of transparency laws. Legal
theorists have long known that it is risky to fixate on the “law on
books” to the neglect of the “law in action,” as the two constantly
come apart (Pound 1910). Yet it is especially risky to do so in the
open government field, given the heterogeneity of transparency’s
effects and the notoriously imperfect state of compliance with
transparency mandates.
The Right-to-Information (RTI) Rating system, which holds
itself out as “the leading global tool for assessing the strength of
national legal frameworks for accessing information held by public
authorities” (Centre for Law and Democracy 2019), illustrates
the concern. RTI Ratings are based solely on the law on books.
Hence, the United States is awarded points in the “Sanctions”
category because its Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) provides
for sanctions against agency personnel who improperly withhold
records (Youm and Mendel 2018, 260). In practice, however, these
sanctions are rare to nonexistent. One scholar investigating this issue
found exactly one case over the course of two decades in which such
a sanction was applied (Winters 1996, 618).
Equally stark, the U.S. Congress amended FOIA in 1974 to clarify
that courts must review de novo all claims of exemption, including
claims of Exemption 1 for classified materials (5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)
(B)). On the books, this looks stunningly transparent. No judicial
deference is to be afforded to the executive branch on national security
secrecy. Zero! In practice, however, the executive almost always wins
when it asserts Exemption 1. Typically, the court grants summary
judgment to the executive without allowing discovery or inspecting any
of the withheld records (Pozen 2017, 1118). Meaningful victories in
national security FOIA challenges, the New York Times’ top newsroom
lawyer has written, “remain legal unicorns” (McCraw 2016).
So, it is simplistic in the extreme to celebrate FOIA for the vigorous
judicial review of national security secrecy that the statute appears to
demand. At the same time, it is also too simple to draw conclusions
exclusively from rates of wins and losses in court, for in the shadow
of judicial review, agencies sometimes declassify requested records
before a judge ever issues a ruling (Kreimer 2008, 1055). If the
statute books overstate the degree to which transparency is realized
in the national security domain, the judicial record understates
it. Neither source, moreover, speaks to the pervasive practice of
executive branch officials’ “leaking” classified information to the
media, notwithstanding an expansive set of criminal prohibitions on
this behavior (Pozen 2013).
It is impossible, then, to understand what is really going on
with government transparency in the United States by parsing
the language of the relevant statutes or, for that matter, judicial
opinions. One would be utterly lost. The same no doubt holds
true for other jurisdictions. Analyses that confine themselves to
the law on books may shed a little light on the actual operations

More Conditional Thinking

If fetishism and formalism are pitfalls to be avoided in this area,
which sorts of approaches are especially well suited to grappling
with the “opacity of transparency” (Fenster 2006)?
On the normative side, it seems to me that a great deal of work is
still needed regarding the conditions under which certain forms of
nontransparency, or partial transparency, are more or less justified.
For instance, when exactly is ex post (rather than ex ante or realtime) disclosure sufficient? When are high-level summaries (rather
than complete transcripts) sufficient? When is divulgence to an
oversight body (rather than the public at large) sufficient?
These sorts of institutionally grounded, middle-range questions
have received only modest attention in the theoretical literature.
Most “are hardly explored” (Cucciniello, Porumbescu, and
Grimmelikhuijsen 2017, 41) in the empirical literature as well.
They are pivotal questions for the next wave of transparency
reformers, however. And they are difficult. The answers may vary
depending not only on the character of the underlying information
but also on the attributes and incentives of the information-holding
bodies and the degree to which they are held accountable through
other mechanisms. It is not enough to ask whether certain sorts of
processes or documents may legitimately be shielded from full and
immediate public view. Transparency scholarship must press further
to ask which parts of those processes and documents realistically can
and should be shielded, to what extent, by whom, from whom, for
how long, and pursuant to what safeguards.
More Sociological Study

On the descriptive side, it seems to me that we need to expect both
less and more from transparency: less in the way of unqualified
upsides or immediately apparent consequences, and more in the way
of unintended second- and third-order effects.
Gregory Michener’s recent Viewpoint essay explains persuasively
that many transparency policies “generate gradual, indirect, and
diffuse impacts” (2019, 136), which may be missed by studies
that concentrate on short time frames or on the most readily
tabulated outcome variables. Michener worries that a focus on
direct, quantifiable metrics leads scholars to undervalue the benefits
that transparency policies bring, even in situations of lackluster
implementation, as when these policies help foster bureaucratic
competency or coordination in the medium run. A focus on such
metrics, however, can likewise lead scholars to overvalue transparency.
Qualitative research on the U.S. administrative state, for instance,
suggests that certain transparency policies can lead, over time, to
the hollowing out of bureaucratic capacity when transparency is
weaponized by political opponents and regulated parties or enlisted
repeatedly as a substitute for stronger regulation (Pozen 2018).
It cannot be taken for granted that by investigating a transparency
policy’s gradual, indirect, and diffuse impacts, the policy will come
Seeing Transparency More Clearly 329
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off looking better than if it were examined in a narrower fashion.
The scholarly payoff from investigating these impacts is not that we
will thereby reaffirm our priors and restore faith in transparency.
The payoff is that doing so will allow us to learn more about how
transparency works, whether for good or for ill.
To operationalize his insights, Michener calls for “greater use of
qualitative and mixed methods,” including “careful tracing of impact
processes and indicators, combined with sensible counterfactual
reasoning” (2019, 136). I wish to echo and extend this call, and
to suggest a label that can capture the sort of project Michener
envisions and the many different forms of academic inquiry that
can participate in it: a sociological turn. If this label sounds strange,
recall that transparency, like secrecy, is social by nature. Just as
secrets are kept from certain actors, transparency is provided to
certain actors. Transparency is an interpersonal, intersubjective, and
relational phenomenon. Sociology, as conventionally defined (e.g.,
American Sociological Association 2019), integrates the insights of
multiple fields to explore such phenomena as they play out in and
across particular institutional settings.
A sociological approach is hardly a straitjacket. It need not require
the adoption of any discrete theoretical paradigm. It can have a
more or less historical flavor, a more or less ethnographic flavor,
a more or less comparative flavor, and so on. The one thing to
which a sociological approach (at least in the loose conception I am
invoking) commits the researcher is critical scrutiny of the social
dimensions of transparency policies: the cultural, political, and
organizational environments in which they arise and evolve; the
unwritten norms that condition their usage; the power dynamics
and distributional disparities they reflect and create, within and
beyond the corridors of government; the adaptive behaviors and
counter-behaviors and counter-counter-behaviors they inspire; and
all the other ways in which these policies shape, and in turn are
shaped by, human agency and collective action.
A sociological approach, on this understanding, is less a matter
of specialized disciplinary training than of emphasis and
“imagination” (Mills 1959), less a matter of technique than of
the questions that are posed and the answers that are taken to be
satisfactory. It involves moving beyond threshold indicators such as
response rates and processing times—suggestive as these data may
be—and attending to broader features of transparency policies,
with an eye toward the iterated interactions between formal legal
structures and informal developments in the communities that
supply, demand, and interpret information. In short, it reflects a
commitment to reckoning with transparency in its full complexity
as a social phenomenon—not in every study, but in the overall
balance of work that is produced and in the orientation and
aspirations of the field.
Conclusion
A sociological turn in transparency studies would also be something
of a return. As exemplified by Georg Simmel (1906) and Max
Weber (1922), the leading prewar theorists of transparency’s twin—
secrecy—were intensely interested in the social life of secrets and
revelations, their uses as tools of social control and their effects on the
circulation of power within institutions. Needless to say, this is not
the place to delve into Simmel’s or Weber’s thought. My submission
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is simple: the sociological study of secrecy generated powerful
insights in the past. It can do so for transparency today. If this essay
is right that transparency is (1) implausible as a primary virtue in
governance, (2) ambiguous as a secondary virtue, and (3) inherently
social in nature, then sociological inquiry, broadly conceived, gives us
our best hope for developing a deep understanding of transparency
policies and their many and varied impacts.
References
Alloa, Emmanuel. 2018. Transparency: A Magic Concept of Modernity. In
Transparency, Society, and Subjectivity: Critical Perspectives, edited by Emmanuel
Alloa and Dieter Thomä, 21–55. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
American Sociological Association. 2019. What Is Sociology? https://www.asanet.
org/about-asa/asa-story/what-sociology [accessed November 26, 2019].
Bächtiger, André, John S. Dryzek, Jane Mansbridge, and Mark E. Warren. 2018.
Deliberative Democracy: An Introduction. In The Oxford Handbook of
Deliberative Democracy, edited by André Bächtiger, John S. Dryzek, Jane
Mansbridge, and Mark E. Warren, 1–31. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Barney, Darin. 2008. Politics and Emerging Media: The Revenge of Publicity. Global
Media Journal 1(1): 89–106.
Binder, Sarah A., and Frances E. Lee. 2013. Making Deals in Congress. In
Negotiating Agreement in Politics: Report of the Task Force on Negotiating
Agreement in Politics, edited by Jane Mansbridge and Cathie Joe Martin, 54–72.
Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.
Centre for Law and Democracy. 2018. Afghanistan Jumps to Top Position on RTI
Rating. https://www.law-democracy.org/live/afghanistan-jumps-to-top-positionon-rti-rating [accessed November 26, 2019].
Centre for Law and Democracy. 2019. Global RTI Rating. https://www.lawdemocracy.org/live/rti-rating/global [accessed November 26, 2019].
Congressional Research Institute. 2019. 500+ Citations on the Transparency Problem.
http://www.congressionalresearch.org/Citations.html [accessed November 26,
2019].
Cucciniello, Maria, Gregory A. Porumbescu and Stephan Grimmelikhuijsen. 2017.
25 Years of Transparency Research: Evidence and Future Directions. Public
Administration Review 77(1): 32–44.
Erkkilä, Tero. 2012. Government Transparency: Impacts and Unintended Consequences.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Fenster, Mark. 2006. The Opacity of Transparency. Iowa Law Review 91(3): 885–949.
Gilbert, Michael D. 2018. Transparency and Corruption: A General Analysis.
University of Chicago Legal Forum 2018(1): 117–38.
Hood, Christopher. 2006. Transparency in Historical Perspective. In Transparency:
The Key to Better Governance? edited by Christopher Hood and David Heald,
3–23. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Karkkainen, Bradley C. 2001. Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm? Georgetown Law
Journal 89(2): 257–370.
Kreimer, Seth F. 2008. The Freedom of Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency.
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 10(5): 1011–80.
Lee, Gia B. 2008. The President’s Secrets. George Washington Law Review 76(1):
197–261.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1967. Secularization and Moral Change. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Martin, Cathie Jo. 2013. Conditions for Successful Negotiation: Lessons from
Europe. In Negotiating Agreement in Politics: Report of the Task Force on
Negotiating Agreement in Politics, edited by Jane Mansbridge and Cathie Joe
Martin, 121–43. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.
McCraw, David. 2016. FOIA Litigation Has Its Own Rules, but We Deserve Better.
Just Security. https://www.justsecurity.org/29974/foia-litigation-rules-deserve
[accessed November 24, 2019].

Public Administration Review • March | April 2020

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3478005

Meijer, Albert. 2013. Understanding the Complex Dynamics of Transparency. Public
Administration Review 73(3): 429–39.
Michener, Gregory. 2015. Policy Evaluation via Composite Indexes: Qualitative
Lessons from International Transparency Policy Indexes. World Development
74(1): 184–96.
———. 2019. Gauging the Impact of Transparency Policies. Public Administration
Review 79(1): 136–39.
Mills, C. Wright. 1959. The Sociological Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Neacsu, Dana. 2019. Book Review: Troubling Transparency: The History and Future
of Freedom of Information. International Journal of Legal Information 47(1): 53.
O’Neill, Onora. 2002. A Question of Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pound, Roscoe. 1910. Law in Books and Law in Action. American Law Review 44(1):
12–36.
Pozen, David E. 2013. The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and
Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information. Harvard Law Review 127(2):
512–635.
——— 2017. Freedom of Information beyond the Freedom of Information Act.
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 165(5): 1097–158.
——— 2018. Transparency’s Ideological Drift. Yale Law Journal 128(1): 100–65.
Pozen, David E., and Michael Schudson. 2018. Introduction. In Troubling
Transparency: The History and Future of Freedom of Information, edited by David
E. Pozen and Michael Schudson, 1–10. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rosanvallon, Pierre. 2008. Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust,
translated by Arthur Gold hammer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Samaha, Adam M. 2006. Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for
Judicial Intervention. UCLA Law Review 53(4): 909–76.
Schauer, Frederick. 2011. Transparency in Three Dimensions. University of Illinois
Law Review 2011(4): 1339–57.
Schudson, Michael. 2015. The Rise of the Right to Know: Politics and the Culture of
Transparency, 1945–1975. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Simmel, Georg. 1906. The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies. American
Journal of Sociology 11(4): 441–98.
Transparency International. 2018. Corruption Perceptions Index 2017. https://www.
transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017 [accessed
November 25, 2019].
Warren, Mark E., and Jane Mansbridge. 2013. Deliberative Negotiation. In
Negotiating Agreement in Politics: Report of the Task Force on Negotiating
Agreement in Politics, edited by Jane Mansbridge and Cathie Joe Martin, 86–120.
Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.
Weber, Max. 1922. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie
[Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology]. Tübingen,
Germany: Mohr.
Winters, Paul M. 1996. Revitalizing the Sanctions Provision of the Freedom of
Information Act Amendments of 1974. Georgetown Law Journal 84(3): 617–39.
Youm, Kyu Ho, and Toby Mendel. 2018. The Global Influence of the United States
on Freedom of Information. In Troubling Transparency: The History and Future
of Freedom of Information, edited by David E. Pozen and Michael Schudson,
249–68. New York: Columbia University Press.

Seeing Transparency More Clearly 331

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3478005

